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ABSTRACT
This paper develops the notion of “event seizure” to better under-
stand how mega-events, and the elites associated with them, take
possession of host cities and societies—of development plans,
funds and legislation—and impose their priorities on cities and
citizens. It illustrates how event seizure plays out in the preparations
for the Football World Cup 2018 in Russia, which is on course to
become the most expensive World Cup ever with a total cost of
about USD 20 billion. Drawing on government and FIFA documents,
public statements from authorities and oﬃcials, and media cover-
age, the paper examines three diﬀerent dimensions of event sei-
zure. First, infrastructural seizure, where event-related infrastructure,
particularly sports venues, crowd out infrastructure that serves
wider urban needs. Second, ﬁnancial seizure, where a close circle
of political and business elites beneﬁts from state funding, while the
public underwrites cost overruns. Third and last, legal seizure, where
the event introduces exceptional legislation, infringing citizen rights
and compromising due oversight of event preparations.
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Introduction
When Russia was awarded the right to host the Football World Cup 2018, using the
event for national and urban development was a central goal. Ninety per cent of the
initial investment was intended for developing infrastructure for the long-term needs of
cities and communities (Tovkaylo, 2010; Zubko, 2010). Russia, some commentators
claimed, was set to “make a giant leap forward in terms of development” (quoted in
Zubko, 2010, p. np). The government saw the event as an instrument for fast-tracking
development master plans: “We would have spent this money even without the World
Cup, but the World Cup is speeding up the realisation of some parts of the [develop-
ment] programme” (Kazmin, Mokrousova, & Tovkaylo, 2013). Oﬃcials were eager to
emphasise that the beneﬁts of the World Cup would extend well beyond the sports
stadia to beneﬁt cities around Russia. The Federal Minister of Sports, Vitaliy Mutko, in
charge of the World Cup, underscored that for cities “there will not only be investments
into a new stadium. The majority of objects . . . are transport, tourism and technical
infrastructure. We are talking about the development of the whole region that plays
host to the World Cup” (quoted in Krylov, 2014).
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But just a few years into the preparation for the event, these goals had all but
faded from view. Almost all of the money was now due to be invested into event-
speciﬁc infrastructure with limited utility for the general public instead of wider
urban improvements. Cost overruns and opaque awarding of contracts were pla-
guing major construction projects and exceptions to the rule of law hollowed out
fundamental legislation, infringing citizens’ basic rights. The preparation for the
World Cup had rewritten development priorities, appropriated funds and elevated
the event above the regular legislative order, thus displacing concerns of cities and
citizens.
In this paper, I aim to conceptualise the radical transformation of the World Cup
2018 from handmaid to hindrance of urban and regional development in Russia—a
process I call event seizure. In event seizure, the mega-event, and the elites asso-
ciated with it, take possession of development agendas and funds and impose their
own priorities. On the basis of bid documentation, press releases, legislation,
published statements from authorities and oﬃcials and technical and research
reports, the paper examines the driving factors, the mechanisms and the impacts
of event seizure for the World Cup 2018 in Russia across three dimensions. First,
infrastructural seizure, that is, the dominance of event-related infrastructure such as
stadia over wider urban improvements; second, ﬁnancial seizure, where the public is
made to pay for unproﬁtable projects and cost overruns, while elites beneﬁt; third,
legal seizure, which introduces exceptions into legislation that place the event above
the law.
Mega-events: from leverage to event seizure
It is common to think that mega-events can speed up urban and regional develop-
ment and help attain larger development goals, say economic growth or infrastruc-
ture upgrades. Event-governing bodies such as Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA, the governing body of the Football World Cup) or the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) have employed this idea of leveraging
events increasingly to justify the signiﬁcant social and ﬁnancial costs of mega-events.
With more and more mega-events moving into emerging economies, this develop-
mental rationale has gained further in strength. “FIFA has taken on a mission to use
the game as a tool to develop whole countries, give momentum to investment, and
so create a better life for millions of people” (Zubko, 2010), so the oﬃcial line
claims. Bidding coalitions in host cities and countries, too, praise mega-events as
boons to economic development and urban restructuring (cf. Andranovich &
Burbank, 2011). Consulting companies have issued reports extolling the multiple
beneﬁts of hosting mega-events (Ernst & Young, 2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers,
2011). Thus, the World Cup 2010 in South Africa aimed to reduce poverty (Pillay
& Bass, 2008), the Olympic Games in London were a vehicle to revitalise boroughs
in East London (Poynter & MacRury, 2009), the Winter Olympics 2014 in Sochi
were meant to turn the destination into a world-class winter sports resort (Müller,
2014) and the World Cup 2014 in Brazil and the 2016 Summer Games were to
advance urban transport and upgrade neighbourhoods in Rio de Janeiro (Gaﬀney,
2010).
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That partisan groups—event organisers, governing bodies and contractors—will
seek to promote mega-events to a wider public does not come as a surprise. But
recently organisations without an explicit stake in mega-events have started to
peddle them as catalysts for urban and human development. Among them are
international development agencies such as the German Development Agency
(2013) or foundations such as the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2011). Scholars, too,
have reinforced claims about the catalytic function of mega-events for urban devel-
opment, citing beneﬁts such as economic growth, infrastructure provision, increased
quality of life and image improvement. Thus, studies claim that mega-events “accel-
erate [a city’s] infrastructural development by up to 10 years” (Preuss, 2004, p. 232)
and that hosts can use mega-events “as powerful catalysts to accelerate their urban
and transport plans” (Kassens-Noor, 2013, p. 393). Mega-events, some maintain,
“generate an unequivocal economic beneﬁt to host cities” (Gratton, Shibli, &
Coleman, 2005, p. 997). Concepts such as “leveraging” (Chalip, 2006), “legacy”
(Holt & Ruta, 2015) and “catalyst” (Essex & Chalkley, 1998) have proliferated,
underscoring how cities and citizens can beneﬁt from mega-events and harness
them for urban development.
But there is another, altogether more problematic side to mega-events. Rather than
a catalyst for infrastructure or an economic boon, mega-events often lead to an
overpromising of beneﬁts and an underestimation of costs, the unequal appropriation
of resources, the violation of citizen rights and the rewriting of urban development
priorities to serve the demands of the event (Boykoﬀ, 2014; Horne, 2007; Müller,
2015; Zimbalist, 2015). Thus, the relationship between mega-events and host societies
is often the inverse of what promoters of mega-events suggest. Instead of cities and
citizens using the event to promote wider gains, it is the event, and its backers, that
use cities and citizens. Mega-events represent an abrupt intervention from outside
into host societies, a self-induced shock (Grabher & Thiel, 2014) that reorders
economic, political and social relations in a short period of time—often for the
beneﬁt of a select few.
To account for this disruptive character of the event, this paper proposes the concept
of event seizure. The concept represents the often abrupt intervention of events in host
societies, disrupting established processes of decision-making, public oversight and
legislation. Close to the medical sense of seizure—a sudden and uncontrollable attack
—it suspends the normal functioning of host societies and monopolises attention and
resources.
Event seizure is a two-way process. On the one hand, the event seizes host
societies, imposing speciﬁc requirements with regard to venues, funding guarantees,
legal protection and exception, transport arrangements and security, among others.
On the other hand, host elites also seize the event, harnessing it to appropriate
resources and buttress their interests. Among these elites can be national and local
politicians, who seek to garner votes and fast-track urban development, land owners,
who are keen to develop real estate, and business leaders, who stand to proﬁt from
contracts and sponsorship opportunities (Hall, 2006). As such, the concept of event
seizure recognises that events usually beneﬁt both the owners of the event—the IOC,
FIFA and other event-governing bodies and sports organisations—and the elites in
the host countries.
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Event seizure: three dimensions
Event seizure, as it is proposed here, has three constitutive dimensions: infrastructural,
ﬁnancial and legal. The infrastructural dimension of event seizure refers to the creation
of privileged infrastructure for the event. Projects for long-term urban and regional
development are often shelved as “nice to haves”, as the priorities of the event redirect
funding towards sports venues and event-related transportation, often to cover the
exorbitant cost overruns (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012). The closer the opening ceremony
draws, the more likely it is that the necessities of the event appropriate funding that was
meant for other projects, for example, new transport connections, hospitals, schools,
housing or social inclusion (de Paula, 2014; Minnaert, 2012). Moreover, event require-
ments dictate sizes that are often too large for the quotidian demands of post-event use,
resulting in underutilised and unproﬁtable infrastructure (Alm, Solberg, Storm, &
Jakobsen, in press; Horne, 2007).
In the ﬁnancial dimension of event seizure, public funds are used to support
unproﬁtable infrastructure, such as stadia, and step in when private funding falls
short of initial expectations (Gaﬀney, 2014; Scherer, 2011). Funding for event infra-
structure often comes from the public, since private investors are reluctant to invest in
the numerous unproﬁtable facilities that come with the hosting of mega-events
(Almeida, Bolsmann, Júnior, & Souza, 2013; Zimbalist, 2015). Financial seizure is
encapsulated in the excessive cost overruns of mega-events. On average, mega-events
overrun their initial budget by 179%, dwarﬁng the 27% average overrun for large-scale
transport projects (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012). With the bulk of the funding coming
from the state, the public also bears the risks for this cost overrun. The opacity in
awarding contracts and the lack of democratic decision-making exacerbate ﬁnancial
event seizure. Thus, the elites who drive the bid are at the same time those who stand to
proﬁt most, for example through developing properties, receiving contracts for event
preparation and construction or participating in kickbacks (Burbank, Andranovich, &
Heying, 2001).
The third and last dimension of event seizure is the legal dimension, where mega-
events precipitate a state of exception in which regular planning, ﬁscal and juridical
rules no longer apply and the requirements of the event take precedence. If that
happens, mega-events create what Agamben calls “a no-man’s land between public
law and political fact” (Agamben, 2005, p. 1), where the necessities of the event overrule
regular legal procedures. With their ﬁxed deadlines, challenging delivery and national
signiﬁcance, mega-events are prone to being declared such necessities (e.g. Boykoﬀ,
2014; Coaﬀee, 2015; Sánchez & Broudehoux, 2013). The closer an event draws and the
greater the urgency of ﬁnishing construction and preparation, the more likely it
becomes that a mega-event undermines the rule of law.
While none of these dimensions is novel in itself, the concept of event seizure
recognises that these need to be examined together in order to obtain a fuller under-
standing of how events interact with their hosts on multiple levels. Infrastructural
seizure, for example, can drive up infrastructure costs and force the public to step in
if private investors pull out. The relaxing of existing rules and procedures through legal
seizure facilitates the proﬁteering and cost overruns that are characteristic of ﬁnancial
seizure. Investigating just one dimension would miss the interconnections between all
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three of them. The notion of “seizure” also puts an emphasis on the processes and
antecedents of negative event outcomes, that is, on the reasons why events may turn
from catalysts into deadweight for urban and regional development. In so doing, it
underscores the importance of the pre-event phase for determining post-event
outcomes.
The World Cup 2018 in Russia: factors contributing to event seizure
Scholars have advanced several explanations to better understand the relationship
between mega-events and host societies. Mega-events have been considered as a driver
of urban entrepreneurialism, as a means of international signalling and as a spectacle
masking uneven development. This section brieﬂy reviews these explanations, arguing
that none of them is suﬃcient to fully capture the situation in Russia, where a number
of factors contribute to the salience of event seizure.
Scholars have frequently placed mega-events in the larger context of urban entrepre-
neurialism: cities in search of growth opportunities under conditions of an increasingly
neoliberal global economy (Burbank et al., 2001; Hall, 2006). Mega-events become a
vehicle of urban entrepreneurialism, where they help to attract capital and private
investment and dispossess citizens living on undervalued land for rapid capital accu-
mulation (Gaﬀney, 2010; Harvey, 1989; Trubina, 2015). But the entrepreneurial ele-
ments in Russia are thin on the ground. While entrepreneurialism is a trope on the
discursive level, the preparation for the World is a state-led project, in which questions
of return on investment and introducing market mechanisms play a marginal role. As
with the Sochi Olympics in 2014, the organisation of the event is in the hands of the
federal authorities, which also contribute the largest share of funding (see Table 1). The
Ministry of Sports coordinates the preparation for the event and for that purpose has
established two separate organisations. First, the Local Organising Committee of the
World Cup, which is in charge of the operational aspects of event preparation and
liaises with FIFA. Second, Sport Engineering is a federal enterprise that acts as the
developer and general contractor for the football stadia.
Scholars have found international signalling to be of particular importance for
emerging nations hosting mega-events (Cornelissen, 2010; Tomlinson, 2010). Mega-
events serve to communicate international diplomatic stature and attractiveness as a
means of soft power—a coming-of-age, as it were, of emerging countries, aspiring to be
included in the club of leading global powers. But while this aspect was prominent for
the 2014 Winter Games in Sochi (Persson & Petersson, 2014), it occupies a backseat for
Table 1. Planned expenditures for the World Cup 2018 according to national government.
TOTAL RUB 664 billion (ca. USD 20 billion)
By Purpose RUB bn Percentage of total By Source RUB bn Percentage of total
Transport 337 51% Federal 336 51%
Sport infrastructure 174 26% Private 102 34%
Security 31 5% Regional 226 16%
Other (accommodation,
health, energy supply, etc.)
122 18%
Source: Postanovlenie 518 from 20 June 2013.
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the 2018 World Cup. This may well be due to the annexation of Crimea, which
thwarted Russian eﬀorts to improve its image on the global stage and led to a signiﬁcant
decrease of positive attitudes towards Russia in most countries around the world.
Growing international apprehensiveness of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, repeated
calls for boycotting the World Cup or taking it away from Russia, and deep-rooted
racism in Russian football (Rainsford, 2015) have made the Russian government wary
of touting the event on the international stage (Yatsyk, 2015).
Last, organisers of the World Cup in Russia also do not conceive of it or consciously
stage it as a spectacle—the conspicuous presentation and consumption that often masks
uneven development and rising social inequities but also uniﬁes societies, placating
social and political dissent in the interest of continued capital accumulation. Scholars
have analysed several mega-events through the lens of spectacle—most notably the
Beijing Olympics (Broudehoux, 2007; Shin, 2012). But while the stadium architecture
and the event itself no doubt have awe-inspiring, enthralling qualities, the Russian
authorities are not playing up the spectacular aspects of the World Cup. Perhaps the
extravaganza of the Winter Games 2014 in Sochi—at USD 55 billion total costs the
most expensive Olympic Games in history—is too fresh in the public memory. In times
of economic recession, resources are too scarce to lavish them on projects that the
public could perceive as wasteful. Moreover, the poor performance of Russia’s national
team in recent World Cups—it qualiﬁed for the group stage in only three of the six
World Cups since 1994 but never made it beyond it—does not create the same
excitement and thus does not allow the World Cup to be turned into a sports spectacle
to the same degree as, say, in Brazil (Gaﬀney, 2013).
What makes event seizure so prominent in the Russian case is a complex of factors
that is speciﬁc to the preparation of the 2018 World Cup. The combination of these
factors makes it easier for the event to insert itself into political and economic
processes, as the checks and balances for aligning it with development agendas are
weak to start with.
The ﬁrst factor is the presence of a strong so-called “vertical of power”, in which
funding is concentrated and decisions are taken at the federal level and then handed
down the hierarchical ladder. This marginalises cities as the principal hosts and
stakeholders in decision-making and facilitates that the priorities of the event and the
interests of national elites crowd out those of cities and residents. Second, the lead of
the coordination for the World Cup is the Ministry of Sports rather than in the
Ministry of Economic Development or the Ministry of Construction, Housing and
Utilities elevates the sport aspects of the event above those of transport, housing, social
services or others that are relevant for urban development.
Third, elites in Russia have a pivotal position in ruling and running the state. It was
elites who initiated the dissolution of the Soviet Union and who built the political order
of post-Soviet Russia. In the absence of free elections, strong political institutions and
independence of business activities from political interference, elites trade their power
in exchange for resources (Yakovlev, 2006). This neopatrimonial system, in which the
distribution of resources in exchange for the loyalty of the elites is common (Yakovlev,
2014), exacerbates event seizure. It turns events primarily into sources for rent extrac-
tion rather than projects to beneﬁt the local population, to support long-term urban
development or to create economic growth (Kinossian & Morgan, 2014).
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Fourth, Russia is characterised by a weak rule of law and dysfunctional formal
institutions (Shlapentokh, 2006; World Justice Project, 2014). This predicament results
in a limited enforceability of laws and regulations and poor public oversight, thus
exacerbating the legal dimension of event seizure and the state of exception that is
associated with events. Fifth, constrained civil liberties and, as a result, a weak civil
society, which results in limited democratic control over government decisions and an
almost complete absence of accountability of the government to the citizens (Freedom
House, 2014). Thus, the voice of the public is diminished when it comes to ensuring
that mega-events serve the citizens. Unlike in Brazil, where large protests during the
Confederations Cup in 2013 directed global attention to the central question “A World
Cup for whom?”, repression of public opinion in Russia makes large-scale protests
unlikely.
Against this background of propitious circumstances for event seizure in Russia, the
paper examines how the process of seizure unfolded in the preparation for the World
Cup 2018. For this purpose, it draws on public printed material from a range of
contexts, including government publications and oﬃcials’ public statements, budgets
and development plans, federal and regional legislation, reports from FIFA and con-
sulting agencies, and federal and regional media coverage from news agencies, news-
papers and online portals. I identiﬁed media articles with a key word search of “World
Cup 2018” in the database Integrum, which covers all major Russian newspapers, and
through more speciﬁc search terms, for example, using the stadium name when looking
for material on stadia. Articles were then sourced from Integrum or straight from the
website. Given extensive state intervention in the media, I have sought, wherever
possible, to rely on independent Russian newspapers or news agencies, but have
drawn from government-owned or inﬂuenced newspapers when presenting the point
of view of the Russian government. Analysis of the documents proceeded in an
inductive fashion with the aim of trying to better understand the processes of preparing
for the World Cup 2018. The notion of event seizure—and its three dimensions—
emerged after the analysis as a description of the phenomena found and was not
imposed on it from the start.
Each of the following sections looks at one of the dimensions of event seizure. The
ﬁrst is concerned with infrastructural seizure and shows how professional-grade sports
infrastructure prevails over infrastructure for larger urban development needs; the
second section considers ﬁnancial seizure and elite appropriation of rents, while the
public has to cover the risks of cost overruns; and the third and ﬁnal section examines
legal seizure and the introduction of exceptional event-related legislation into Russian
jurisdiction.
Infrastructural seizure: creating privileged infrastructure
The planning process for the World Cup started in the spirit of the bid, intending to
spread infrastructural development to the whole of Russia. From the initial pool of 13
applicants, on 29 September 2012, the organisers chose 11 host cities, all located in
the European part of Russia (see Figure 1). While Moscow and St. Petersburg are
included, the rest are provincial capitals, which have much smaller populations, much
lower international proﬁles, and less developed infrastructural bases, reﬂecting the
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uneven spatial articulation of post-socialist urban development (Golubchikov,
Badyina, & Makhrova, 2014). Making it on the list of host cities was important for
cities for at least two reasons. First, in a highly centralised budgetary system, it
promised access to federal money for regional development. Despite attempts at
decentralisation in the 1990s, revenue raising powers remain concentrated in
Moscow and cities are dependent on transfers from higher levels of the administra-
tion (Kinossian, 2013). Cities hoped that the selection as a host for the World Cup
would oﬀer a route to secure funding for fast-tracking investments. Expressing this
expectation, Leonid Rapoport, the Minister of Sports for the Sverdlovsk Region, of
which Ekaterinburg is the capital, declared: “That’s not just funding for the develop-
ment of sporting infrastructure, it’s funding for roads, to build the metro, to realise
the Straži Urala complex [twin high-rise oﬃce towers], for environmental, medical,
informational issues” (RIA Novosti, 2012).
The second reason was the expected boost that new infrastructure projects and
hosting World Cup Games would provide in the quest for an international reputation.
While ambitions to position themselves in the global urban competition have char-
acterised Moscow and St. Petersburg for some time now (Golubchikov, 2010; Trumbull,
2010), these have also started to spread to second-order cities such as Nizhniy
Novgorod or Kazan’ (Kinossian, 2012; Makarychev & Yatsyk, 2015), which are increas-
ingly seeking to position themselves in the global symbolic economy and the attendant
capital ﬂows (cf. Koch, 2014).
Figure 1. Map of stadia and of transport infrastructure for the World Cup 2018 in Russia. Source:
Author.
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The central administration asked the 11 host cities to submit development projects
for the World Cup investment programme. True to the idea of harnessing the event as a
catalyst, the cities viewed this as a chance to include those projects that were high on
their development agendas—new transport lines, parks, neighbourhoods—even though
these may have had no immediate relation to the World Cup. In total, the 11 host cities
submitted 1,129 projects with a total cost of USD 42 billion [RUB 1,390 billion]
(Kazmin et al., 2013)—close to the bill of the Sochi Olympics or a little less than 10%
of the annual federal budget of Russia.1
In the spring of 2013, the central government needed to make a ﬁnal decision on the
budget for the event. At that time, the preparations for Sochi were spiralling out of
control, with facilities lagging behind schedule and ever higher cost estimates (Orttung
& Zhemukhov, 2014). The economic growth forecasts for Russia looked dim and
oﬃcials wanted to avoid the World Cup becoming another uncontrollable drain on
the budget. As a consequence, the list of projects had to be reduced and the necessity
for the event became the major criterion for funding projects. In June 2013, the
government approved 271 projects for a total of USD 20 billion [RUB 660 billion]
(Government of the Russian Federation, 2013). These included 7 new stadia, 86 training
grounds, 62 hotels as well as the upgrades for the airport terminals and the links
between the airport and the city. Table 1 details the allocation of costs to the diﬀerent
categories.
Encapsulating the infrastructural dimension of event seizure, the trimmed prepara-
tion list reﬂected the demands of the event rather than those of urban development. As
Igor’ Shuvalov, Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the World Cup, remarked: “We
have trimmed absolutely everything. There is nothing extraneous, not a single obsolete
object. [We have kept] only what is associated with the World Cup” (quoted in
Rozhkov & Kazmin, 2013). The projects of immediate relevance for the event or
required by FIFA received approval, whereas those relating to wider urban development
issues were cut.
Among the projects that did not make it on the list were metro extensions, road
resurfacing projects, hospital renovations, communication infrastructure upgrades at
the local level, but also a high-speed rail link between Moscow and Kazan’ (see
Figure 1) of about USD 30 billion. Instead, airport extensions, transport links from
the airport to the stadium, training sites and hotel accommodations received approval.
This scaling down of the investment programme redirected funding towards the
immediate needs of the event and its stakeholders and away from those of the cities
and its citizens.
Stadia provide a good illustration of infrastructural event seizure, because they have
the highest priority in the construction programme. If nothing else is ﬁnished, the
stadia need to be completed to host the event. This requirement makes them privileged
infrastructure, but also turns them into potential resource drains, since completion
needs to happen at any cost. This privileged status became evident in 2015, when the
Russian government imposed a 10% general cut to the federal budget, but ringfenced
expenditure for the World Cup stadia.
Table 2 provides an overview of the sizes and costs of the stadia. Six of the twelve
stadia are being constructed from scratch for the World Cup, while a further four are
new, but were built for other occasions such as the Universiade 2013 (Kazan’), as stadia
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for the football clubs Spartak and Zenit (Moscow and St. Petersburg) or for the 2014
Winter Olympic Games (Sochi). The two remaining ones, Luzhniki in Moscow and the
Central Stadium in Ekaterinburg, are upgraded, but at a cost that is similar to a new-
build.
Financial seizure: public funding, cost overruns and elite proﬁteering
Financial seizure occurs where funds, usually from the public purse, are directed to the
event but produce limited public beneﬁt. Often, these funds have to cover the cost
overruns from construction and thus beneﬁt the developers and contractors, which tend
to be large, well-connected corporations. The ﬁxed deadlines for the delivery of sport
infrastructure exacerbates these cost overruns, since pushing the deadline back to avoid
additional shifts or expensive equipment is impossible. Infrastructural seizure through
the creation of privileged infrastructure thus also increases ﬁnancial seizure.
For the World Cup 2018, ﬁnancial seizure has three aspects. The ﬁrst is a high and
rising share of public funds that are used for unproﬁtable projects with limited beneﬁt
for the public; the second is elite proﬁteering from state contracts; and the third is cost
overruns. Even though private investment was meant to contribute more than one-third
to the total costs for the World Cup (see Table 1), it only funded one stadium: Spartak
in Moscow. All other stadia were ﬁnanced from the federal budget. Similar to the
World Cups in South Africa and Brazil (Almeida et al., 2013), private investors and the
clubs themselves were reluctant to take on the investment risks of stadia due to the
arenas’ questionable commercial prospects. Sochi, Saransk, Kaliningrad and Volgograd,
for example, do not have clubs in the top division and it will likely be the federal
government who will take care of upkeep costs if the clubs cannot aﬀord them.
The stadium construction creates artiﬁcial supply that will outstrip demand in cities,
even if some of the capacities are to be reduced after the event, as envisioned. The
largest stadia in Russia have just over 30,000 seats. Even before new construction, most
World Cup cities had stadia that were adequate for the demand. The average occupancy
rate for the stadia of the top 15 teams in Russia is below 60%. Whereas stadia in Russia
had a seating capacity of about 1.4 million at the time of the bid in 2010, the new
venues will add about 400,000 new seats and expand the existing capacity by more than
a quarter. This is not counting other new stadium projects, which will contribute
another 150,000 seats (KPMG, 2014).
This new capacity meets a situation where attendance of football matches is among
the lowest in Europe. The total number of spectators per season is about 2.8 million, or
2.0% of the Russian population. That’s far below England’s and Germany’s 13–14
million, or, respectively, 24% and 16% of the population. On average, 13,000 fans go
to a Russian top division game—far below current stadium capacities. Since 2007,
attendance has stagnated at that level, despite the regular upgrade of stadia and rising
disposable income. As a consequence of the low attendance numbers, ticket sales make
up only 5% of Russian clubs’ revenues. Research shows that game attendance is less
dependent on whether stadia are modern or not, but on club marketing (KPMG, 2014).
The new stadia are thus unlikely to attract signiﬁcantly more visitors that would enable
them to recoup their construction and maintenance costs. For Russia, this means that
stadia will consume a large part of the federal budget for the event, but will add little
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additional utility over the existing sports infrastructure. FIFA recognised as much
when, in August 2014, it recommended to reduce the number of stadia to 10—an
oﬀer the Russian government turned down.
The second aspect of ﬁnancial seizure is elite proﬁteering. Oﬃcials went to great
lengths to point out that there would be a break with the proﬂigate planning for the
Winter Games in Sochi, which cost USD 55 billion—an unparalleled amount (Müller,
2014). In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis, the preparation for the World Cup was to
“demonstrate a novel approach to the planning of state expenditure” (Kazmin et al.,
2013). But instead of curbing clientelism, as envisioned, the preparation for the World
Cup has intensiﬁed it. It provides justiﬁcation for state largesse and imposes deadlines,
creating a sense of urgency that compromises checks and balances on state spending
and the awarding of contracts.
That the preparation for the World Cup 2018 also serves the purpose of distributing
resources to cronies is most visible in the role of “Sport Engineering”, a state company
belonging to the Ministry of Sports and holding contracts to develop most of the stadia
(see Table 2, column “developer”). An initial proposal from the Ministry of Sports
suggested having Sport Engineering as the only contractor for building the stadia.
Perceived as one of the most brazen attempts of misappropriating state funds through
intransparent awarding of contracts, the Russian government rejected this proposal and
made a tendering process mandatory (V1, 2012). Nevertheless, Sport Engineering won
the tenders for most stadia, although it was often not the lowest bidder. In fact, it
sometimes remained the only bidder.
Sport Engineering, however, does not do most of the development and projecting
work itself, but contracts it out to Russian or international subcontractors. In those
cases, the amount paid to the ﬁnal contractors is lower than the original sum—some-
times signiﬁcantly so. In one case, Sport Engineering kept between 22% and 32% of the
contract sum, claiming this was because it remained responsible to oversee the project
work. Commentators, on the other hand, suggested that this share exaggerated the true
value added and much of it was going to cronies (Kazmin et al., 2013; V1, 2012).
The third and last aspect of ﬁnancial seizure is the cost overruns associated with
event construction. Non-transparency and a lack of competition have resulted in
inﬂated costs for the stadia. Developers chose contractors often without tenders, citing
time pressure as the main reason. Even the Russian audit chamber, usually a rather
tame body and reluctant to ﬂag ﬁnancial irregularities, found that the contracts for
stadium design were overpriced by more than 100% (Nicholson, 2014). In the 5 years
between the bid in 2010 and March 2015, the projected total cost for the stadia more
than doubled from USD 2.8 billion to USD 6.6 billion (see Table 2). This, however, is
unlikely to be the ﬁnal tally. In South Africa, for example, the cost of the stadia
exploded more than tenfold over the bid estimates (see Figure 2 and Taal, 2011). In
Brazil, the cost increased from USD 1.1 billion in the bid (FIFA, 2007) to about USD 4.4
billion just before the event.
Figure 2 shows that even in March 2015, 3 years before the event, the total costs for
stadia were already higher than in any of the previous four World Cups. At USD 577
million, the average cost per stadium is 58% higher than in Brazil, although stadium
construction for the World Cup 2014 was marred by schedule slips and cost overruns
(Gaﬀney, 2013). Per seat, average costs are USD 11,000 (see Figure 3). The cheapest
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stadium is the upgrade of Luzhniki with a projected USD 7,300 per seat, whereas the
one in St. Petersburg comes in at a steep USD 15,600 per seat. Even the escalated costs
for the World Cup stadia in Brazil still amount to just above USD 6,000 per seat, with
previous World Cups signiﬁcantly cheaper (see Figure 3).2 The high costs and the cost
overruns result in a public subsidy for the contractors of stadium construction, for the
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clubs that are going to play in the stadia and, if not compensated by higher ticket prices,
for the fans of the clubs.
While the costs to the public are going up, private investment, by contrast, is going
down. Private investors were meant to contribute towards the proﬁtable sectors of
World Cup construction, chief among them hotels and expansions of airport capacities.
The envisioned share of 34% of private investments was optimistic to begin with, but
the economic recession, the devaluation of the rouble and the sanctions against Russia
from 2014 have made it even more unlikely that private investors will bear a signiﬁcant
part of the costs. Rising inﬂation and higher interest rates on debt as well as falling
disposable income have made the prospects of ﬁlling additional hotels or passenger
terminals look dire, and banks and investors have become wary at the elevated risks
(Fedorov, 2015).
Legal seizure: precedence of the event
A third and ﬁnal sense in which the event eﬀects a seizure is the preferential legal
treatment it receives. In preparation for the World Cup, the Russian administration
introduced a series of exceptions to existing legislation which go far beyond FIFA’s
oﬃcial requirements. The so-called World Cup Law—federal law 108-FZ, in force since
7 June 2013—stipulates changes to no less than eight fundamental codes, among them
the Civil Code of Russia, the Labour Code, the Tax Code, the Land Code, the
Arbitration Procedure Code, the Housing Code, the Town Planning Code and the
Forest Code.
Some of those changes are familiar from previous World Cups and designed to
safeguard the marketing and sponsorship revenue accruing to FIFA. The most promi-
nent amendment is exemption from income tax and other fees that companies operat-
ing in Russia would otherwise be subject to. This exemption constitutes an indirect
subsidy often ignored when calculating the costs of the event. Another amendment
guarantees FIFA and its partners the exclusive right on all commercial activities in a 2-
km radius around the stadia during the matches. It mandates special brand protection
for the FIFA mark and guarantees extensive exclusive rights of advertisements for
sponsors (Federal Law 108-FZ, chapter 8).
Not just protecting commercial interests, the legislative amendments also curtail the
rights of individual citizens (cf. also Gaﬀney, 2010; Sánchez & Broudehoux, 2013; Shin
& Li, 2013). They weaken or suspend legislation designed to protect citizens against
state arbitrariness or commercial exploitation, or the environment against damage. The
new federal law limits public gatherings during the event and imposes movement
restrictions on citizens (article 13). It allows prohibiting any kind of public event
unrelated to the World Cup, including protests. It suspends public hearings or the
publication of plans for urban rezoning, as mandated in the Town Planning Code
(article 27). Environmental impact assessments are limited to a maximum duration of
45 days (article 29). Authorities and contractors have the right to cut forests for World
Cup construction without having to respect the rules of the Forest Code (article 35).
Of greatest concern, however, are changes in the Civil Code, the fundamental source
of civil law, and the Labour Code. The amendment of the Civil Code facilitates the
imposition of servitudes and expropriations for the World Cup until the end of 2017
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(articles 30 and 32). It continues a tradition of hollowing out property rights for special
events in Russia that was started with the Olympic Games in Sochi 2014 and continued
for the APEC summit in Vladivostok in 2012. The new expropriation regime gives the
aﬀected parties only 10 days to appeal the decision and the compensation oﬀered in
court, and the court another 10 days to reach a verdict (articles 30.25 and 30.26). This
puts up major road blocks for a fair procedure: 10 days are not suﬃcient to determine
the market price for a given property or to prepare for the onerous litigation involved,
leaving aﬀected citizens ill-prepared to defend themselves.
The World Cup Law also modiﬁes the Labour Code, introducing a number of
exceptions that relax protection of workers associated with the operation of the World
Cup, such as staﬀ of FIFA and its subcontractors, broadcasters, marketing partners
and the local organising committee and its subsidiaries (articles 9 and 11). Thus,
employers covered by article 11 do not have to obtain work permits for foreign
workers, can set overtime work schedules and are exempted from compensating
overtime or weekend work according to the rules laid down in the Labour Code.
The law reserves the right to introduce a similar facilitated regime for hiring and
employing foreign workers for infrastructure projects for the event (article 9.5). The
upshot of these revisions is that they not only hollow out basic rights of the Labour
Code, but several of them appear to violate article 37 of the Russian constitution,
which prohibits discrimination against workers, in this case those involved in the
World Cup, and guarantees set working hours and holidays (Labour Confederation of
Russia, 2013).
In preparation for the mega-event, the Russian government has thus suspended basic
rights and violated the fundamental legal principle of equality before the law, privile-
ging the interests of stakeholders associated with the World Cup over those of ordinary
citizens. The amendments to legislation go signiﬁcantly beyond what FIFA requires:
they do not just protect FIFA’s commercial interests, but place the event at large above
the law. Legal seizure facilitates infrastructural and ﬁnancial seizure: it privileges event-
related infrastructure exempting it from numerous legal checks and it increases ﬁnan-
cial seizure through strengthening the position of elites—owners of the rights parcels of
land or of companies with World Cup contracts, politicians—vis-à-vis workers, citizens
and the environment. The weakening of citizen rights, for example, the protection of
property or the right to adequate compensation, proﬁts those elites who have an
immediate stake in the event. This shows well the dual aspect of event seizure,
emphasised earlier. It is not just the event which seizes the host society and introduces
an exception to the regular rule of law—as with the World Cup Law 108-FZ—but it is
also elites seizing the event as a pretext and occasion to claim a share of the resources
connected to it.
Conclusion
This paper has developed the notion of “event seizure” to conceptualise the processes
by which events, and the elites associated with them, take hold of host societies and
impose their own priorities. Event seizure emphasises the disruptive character of
mega-events through which mega-events do not so much serve cities and citizens, as
make them subservient to the event. Event seizure is a dual process in which, on the
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one hand, an event takes advantage of host societies but, on the other hand, domestic
elites take advantage of the exceptional circumstances and the heightened sense of
urgency that mega-events bring with them to extract resources from the event. The
paper has distinguished three dimensions of event seizure. Infrastructural seizure,
where event-related projects crowd out infrastructure that serve wider urban needs;
ﬁnancial seizure, where the public underwrites cost overruns while political and
business elites proﬁt the event; and legal seizure, where the event introduces excep-
tional legislation, infringing citizen rights and opening legal loopholes for event
preparation.
Instead of Russia seizing the event, the event has seized Russia—its resources, its
citizens, its legislation. If the original intention was to harness the World Cup 2018 for
the “long-term needs of cities and communities” (Zubko, 2010, p. np) and speed up
regional development in Russia’s provincial capitals, overpriced infrastructure for the
immediate needs of the event has crowded out the priorities of host cities. Despite
hosting what is set to become the most expensive World Cup ever at USD 20 billion,
much of this money goes into stadia, training sites and airport extensions, which take
precedence over public transport, information and communication infrastructure,
health or education.
Event seizure is a phenomenon not conﬁned to Russia, but occurs in almost all hosts
of large events. The factors facilitating event seizure are present in many host countries
of large event to a greater or lesser degree: hierarchical and intransparent decision-
making, elite capture, a neopatrimonial political system encouraging rent-seeking, weak
rule of law, dysfunctional formal institutions, limited civil society activism and citizen
participation. Thus, event seizure plagued the previous World Cup host countries of
South Africa and Brazil and the preparations for the Olympic Games 2016 in Rio de
Janeiro (Cottle, 2011; Gaﬀney, 2013; Maharaj, 2011). But beyond emerging economies,
it is also evident in the numerous oversized and underused infrastructure objects and
repeated cost overruns that characterise mega-events around the world (Horne, 2007).
It is thus less a question of whether event seizure occurs at all, but to what degree it
occurs and how it can best be counteracted.
Notes
1. All monetary amounts in this paper were calculated in Russian rubles (RUB) in the
original and then converted into US-Dollars (USD) at a rate of RUB 33.45 = 1 USD.
This is the average exchange rate between May 2009 (the time the World Cup bids were
submitted to FIFA) and December 2014 and smoothes out exchange rate ﬂuctuations that
would occur if a rate at one particular point in time was taken.
2. In contrast to previous World Cups, Russia builds a much higher share of new stadia
versus upgrades (Russia: 10 new, 2 upgrade; Brazil: 6 new, 6 upgrade; South Africa: 5 new,
5 upgrade; Germany: 5 new, 7 upgrade). Upgrading stadia, however, does not necessarily
cost less per seat, because of additional costs for removal of outdated equipment and
constraints on construction mandated by the old stadium. Thus, the two upgraded stadia
for the World Cup 2018 have a cost per seat similar to that of the new stadia (see Table 2).
Thus, the diﬀering shares of new versus upgraded stadia cannot fully explain the diﬀerence
in price per seat for the World Cup stadia.
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